Discussion: View Thread

JPAM Early View Preview March 2013

  • 1.  JPAM Early View Preview March 2013

    Posted 03-27-2013 13:52

     

     

    JPAM Preview ▪ March 2013

     

    JPAM Preview is a newsletter that calls attention to forthcoming articles in JPAM.

    JPAM Preview provides brief summaries of content now available digitally in Early View,

    Wiley's online publication system.

     

     

     

     

    Feature Article

    The Use and Efficacy of Capacity-Building Assistance for Low-Performing Districts: The Case of California's District Assistance and Intervention Teams

         Katharine O. Strunk, Andrew McEachin, and Theresa N. Westover

    The theory of action upon which high-stakes accountability policies are based calls for systemic reforms in educational systems that will emerge by pairing incentives for improvement with extensive and targeted technical assistance (TA) to build the capacity of low-performing schools and districts. To this end, a little discussed and often overlooked aspect of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) mandated that, in addition to sanctions, states were required to provide TA to build the capacity of struggling schools and Local Education Agencies (LEAs, or districts) to help them improve student achievement. Although every state in the country provides some form of TA to its lowest performing districts, we know little about the content of these programs or about their efficacy in improving student performance. In this paper, we use both quantitative and qualitative analyses to explore the actions taken by TA providers in one state-California-and examine whether the TA and support tied to California's NCLB sanctions succeeds in improving student achievement. Like many other states, California requires that districts labeled as persistently failing under NCLB (in Program Improvement year 3, PI3) work with external experts to help them build the capacity to make reforms that will improve student achievement. California's lowest performing PI3 districts are given substantial amounts of funding and are required to contract with state-approved District Assistance and Intervention Teams (DAITs), whereas the remaining PI3 districts receive less funding and are asked to access less intensive TA from non-DAIT providers. We use a five-year panel difference-in-difference design to estimate the impacts of DAITs on student performance on the math and English language arts (ELA) standardized tests relative to non-DAIT TA during the two years of the program intervention. We find that students in districts with DAITs perform significantly better on math California Standards Tests (CSTs) averaged over both treatment years and in each of the first and second years. We do not find evidence that students in districts with DAITs perform higher on ELA CSTs over the combined two years of treatment, although we find suggestive evidence that ELA performance increases in the second year of treatment relative to students in districts with non-DAIT TA. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that explore the association between specific activities fostered by DAITs and changes in districts' gains in achievement over the two years of treatment show that DAIT districts that report increasing their focus on using data to guide instruction, shifting district culture to generate and maintain high expectations of students and staff, and increasing within-district accountability for student performance, have higher math achievement gains over the course of the DAIT treatment. In addition, DAIT districts that increase their focus on ELA instruction and shift district culture to one of high expectations have higher ELA achievement gains than do DAIT districts that do not have a similar focus. © 2012 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.  Link to JPAM Early ViewIf you want to cite this article before it is in print, please use the DOI number listed with each article.

     

    Feature Article

    Cream-skimming, Parking and Other Intended and Unintended Effects of High-Powered, Performance-Based Contracts

         Pierre Koning and Carolyn J. Heinrich

    As performance-based contracting in social welfare services continues to expand, concerns about potential unintended effects are also growing. We analyze the incentive effects of high-powered, performance-based contracts and their implications for program outcomes using panel data on Dutch cohorts of unemployed and disabled workers that were assigned to private social welfare providers in 2002 to 2005. We employ a difference-in-differences design that takes advantage of the fact that contracts gradually moved from partial performance-contingent pay to full (100 percent) performance-contingent contracting schemes. We develop explicit measures of selection into the programs and find evidence of cream skimming and other gaming activities on the part of providers, but little impact of these activities on program outcomes. Moving to a system with contract payments fully contingent on performance appears to increase job placements, but not job duration, for more readily employable workers.  Forthcoming in JPAM 32(3)Link to JPAM Early View.  If you want to cite this article before it is in print, please use the DOI number listed with each article.

     

    Feature Article

    Has the Shift to Managed Care Reduced Medicaid Expenditures? Evidence from State and Local-Level Mandates

         Mark Duggan and Tamara Hayford

    From 1991 to 2009, the fraction of Medicaid recipients enrolled in HMOs and other forms of Medicaid managed care (MMC) increased from 11 percent to 71 percent. This increase was largely driven by state and local mandates that required most Medicaid recipients to enroll in an MMC plan. Theoretically, it is ambiguous whether the shift from fee-for-service into managed care would lead to an increase or a reduction in Medicaid spending. This paper investigates this effect using a data set on state- and local-level MMC mandates and detailed data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) on state Medicaid expenditures. The findings suggest that shifting Medicaid recipients from fee-for-service into MMC did not on average reduce Medicaid spending. If anything, our results suggest that the shift to MMC increased Medicaid spending and that this effect was especially present for risk-based HMOs. However, the effects of the shift to MMC on Medicaid spending varied significantly across states as a function of the generosity of the state's baseline Medicaid provider reimbursement rates.  Forthcoming in JPAM 32(3)Link to JPAM Early View.  If you want to cite this article before it is in print, please use the DOI number listed with each article.

     

     

     

     

    Journal of Policy Analysis and Management is published by Wiley Periodicals on behalf of the

    Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

     

    Editor-in-Chief: Maureen Pirog ▪ Indiana University,

    School of Public and Environmental Affairs (and)

    University of Washington,

    Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs

    Managing Editors:

    Robert Kaestner ▪ University of Illinois at Chicago

    Christopher (Kitt) Carpenter ▪ University of California, Irvine 

     

    For any comments or inquiries regarding JPAM, please contact us at jpam@indiana.edu.

     

     

     

    For Table of Contents (TOC) alerts, please follow the instructions below:

     

    1.       Create an account / sign in to Wiley Online Library.

    2.       Click on "Get New Content Alerts" in the JOURNAL TOOLS menu on the JPAM page.

    3.       An e-TOC shows up in your email inbox for each issue!

     

     

     

    Bobby J. Farner

    Assistant Editor and Project Manager,

    Institute for Family and Social Responsibility
    School of Public and Environmental Affairs
    1315 East 10th Street, Room 410
    Indiana University
    Bloomington, Indiana 47405

    Phone:  812.856.5926
    Fax:       812.856.4605

    Email:  bjfarner@indiana.edu