BOOK REVIEW
Ethics in a Capitalist Economy: Why Markets Need Virtues, by Robert CB Miller, Bloomsbury Academic Ireland (2025), 264 pages. £85.00 (hbk). ISBN 978-1-350-51538-3
Capitalism rarely pauses to look at itself in the mirror (Sikula, 1996). It moves forward through contracts signed, risks taken, profits booked, and losses written off. Robert C. B. Miller begins his book with scenes that slow this motion down. He describes ordinary economic actors who believe they are simply playing by the rules, only to discover that the rules do not explain everything that happens to them or because of them. A trader misreads confidence as competence. An entrepreneur mistakes boldness for wisdom. A firm follows incentives and still produces harm. These moments create a quiet tension that stays with the reader. If markets are rational systems, why do they so often depend on judgment, restraint, and trust that cannot be priced or enforced?
Miller, a moral philosopher trained at the University of Reading and deeply engaged with questions of political economy, develops this book from his doctoral work. His academic grounding in neo-Aristotelian ethics combines with sustained engagement with economics, theology, and business practice. This dual formation matters. The book does not treat capitalism as an abstract model, nor does it rely on moral exhortation alone. It approaches markets as human practices shaped by institutions, incentives, and, most importantly, character. Miller writes with the conviction that economic life cannot be understood apart from the moral capacities of the people who inhabit it.
The central claim of the book is clear and consistently developed. Markets need virtues in order to function well, and those virtues arise from human nature rather than from market mechanisms themselves (Aranzadi, 2012). Miller does not argue that markets are immoral by default. He accepts their efficiency, their capacity for coordination, and their role in generating material prosperity. Yet he insists that these achievements rest on moral assumptions that economics often leaves implicit. Trust must precede exchange. Promises must be honoured beyond fear of punishment. Self-interest must be tempered by limits. Without these qualities, capitalism becomes unstable, even if it remains legally intact.
The structure of the book plays a crucial role in making this argument persuasive. The twelve chapters are organized into three broad sections, each building tension and then carrying it forward into the next. The first section establishes the philosophical foundation. The second examines the distinctive features of economic life. The third articulates the specific virtues required for markets to serve human flourishing. Rather than presenting isolated claims, Miller constructs a cumulative case in which later chapters depend on the groundwork laid earlier.
The opening chapter begins with a defence of human nature, a move that may seem unfashionable but proves essential. Miller argues that any serious ethical evaluation of markets requires a view of what human beings are and what they are for. He rejects both moral relativism and purely instrumental accounts of behavior. Human beings, he contends, have characteristic capacities such as reason, sociability, and practical judgment. These capacities generate standards for good and bad action. The second chapter deepens this argument by introducing the idea of natural normativity. Certain ways of acting fulfil human capacities better than others. Ethics, in this view, is not imposed from outside economic life but emerges from the kind of beings who participate in it.
The third chapter completes the first section by linking human nature to virtue. Drawing on Aristotelian thought, Miller presents virtues as stable dispositions that enable people to act well across varying circumstances. This chapter also introduces an important contrast with care ethics. While care ethics emphasizes relational responsiveness and emotional attunement, Miller argues that it does not fully address the moral demands of large-scale, impersonal markets. Capitalist economies require virtues that support cooperation among strangers, respect for abstract rules, and commitment to long-term outcomes. This distinction sets up one of the book’s key contributions to business ethics.
The second section of the book shifts focus from philosophical grounding to the structure of economic life itself. Chapter four examines exchange and contract as moral practices. Miller shows how contracts presuppose honesty and good faith, qualities that cannot be reduced to legal compliance. A contract followed only because of fear of enforcement is already morally thin. The chapter highlights how widespread trust reduces transaction costs and enables complex coordination, while its erosion leads to defensive behavior and inefficiency.
Chapter five turns to property and ownership. Miller treats property not simply as a bundle of rights but as a social institution that supports responsibility, stewardship, and planning. Ownership allows individuals to act with foresight and to bear the consequences of their choices. Yet it also creates temptations toward hoarding and exclusion. The moral quality of property relations, Miller argues, depends on virtues that guide how ownership is exercised rather than on ownership itself.
Chapter six addresses time, risk, and planning. Economic life unfolds across uncertain futures. Saving, investing, and entrepreneurship all involve judgments about what is worth pursuing over time. Miller introduces the idea that patience and hope are moral as well as economic qualities. Short-termism, encouraged by certain market structures, reflects not only flawed incentives but weakened virtues. This chapter establishes a growing tension between market speed and moral deliberation, preparing the reader for later discussions of behavioural failure.
Chapter seven focuses on division of labour and specialization. Miller acknowledges the immense productivity gains that arise when people focus on narrow tasks. At the same time, he explores how specialization can distance individuals from the consequences of their actions. When responsibility is fragmented, moral accountability becomes harder to sustain. This chapter connects directly to contemporary concerns about corporate complexity and moral blindness within large organizations.
Chapter eight concludes the second section by examining welfare, prosperity, and flourishing. Miller carefully distinguishes material well-being from a good life. Markets are effective at generating wealth, but wealth does not automatically translate into flourishing. This chapter resists both consumerist optimism and moral pessimism. It insists that economic success must be evaluated in light of broader human goods, including meaningful work, stable communities, and moral integrity.
The third section of the book moves explicitly into virtue analysis. Chapter nine introduces the idea of contractual virtues, including honesty, reliability, and fairness. These virtues sustain trust and make market coordination possible. Miller argues that legal systems can support but not replace these traits. When honesty declines, enforcement costs rise and markets become brittle. This chapter directly challenges the assumption that well-designed incentives can substitute for character.
Chapter ten draws on insights from behavioural economics to discuss moral weakness. Cognitive biases such as overconfidence, loss aversion, and herd behavior reveal not only limits of rationality but also ethical vulnerabilities. Miller treats self-control, humility, and practical wisdom as virtues that counteract these tendencies. This chapter stands out for integrating empirical research into a virtue-based framework without reducing ethics to psychology.
Chapter eleven addresses entrepreneurship, ambition, and creativity. Miller presents entrepreneurship as a virtue when it involves responsible risk-taking oriented toward genuine value creation. He contrasts this with forms of ambition that prioritize personal gain at the expense of social trust. Philanthropy appears here not as moral compensation for success but as an expression of stewardship. The tension between creation and restraint reaches its peak in this chapter.
The final chapter brings the argument into concrete focus through case studies. These cases examine business practices, financial cultures, and organizational failures, illustrating how the presence or absence of virtue shapes outcomes. Rather than offering moral verdicts, Miller uses these cases to show patterns. Where character is cultivated, markets tend to be resilient. Where it is neglected, crises follow.
Across its twelve chapters, the book makes a sustained contribution to debates on capitalism and ethics, positioning itself in active dialogue with several influential strands of prior scholarship. It extends the line of argument associated with the “bourgeois virtues” tradition by moving beyond the moral dignity of commerce to anchor market morality more firmly in an account of human nature and virtue formation (McCloskey, 2006). In doing so, it also complements work that examines the ethical consequences of markets through multiple normative lenses, offering a more integrated virtue-based framework rather than a comparative survey of ethical approaches (Graafland, 2021). At the same time, the book speaks directly to concerns raised in the literature on financial ethics and systemic failure (Bonvin & Dembinski, 2002), showing how repeated market breakdowns are better understood as symptoms of weakened character and institutionalized moral blindness than as isolated instances of greed or technical incompetence (Dembinski, 2017). For business ethics researchers, the relevance of Miller’s argument is significant. It aligns with theories of social issues management that emphasize legitimacy, stakeholder trust, and long-term value creation. It challenges compliance-driven models of ethics education by shifting attention toward virtue formation. For neo-Aristotelian scholars, the book demonstrates how classical ethical theory can illuminate modern economic life without nostalgia or moralism. Economists interested in capitalism gain a framework for understanding why markets succeed or fail beyond price signals alone. Policy makers are reminded that regulation operates within a moral ecology it cannot fully control.
What makes Ethics in a Capitalist Economy distinctive is its insistence that capitalism is neither self-justifying nor self-correcting. Markets depend on moral habits they do not produce. Character shapes economic outcomes long before regulation or crisis response enters the scene. By tracing this dependence with clarity and patience, Miller restores an older insight to contemporary debate. Capitalism works best when it is carried by people capable of judgment, restraint, and responsibility. Without character, even the most efficient markets lose their way.
Disclosure of interest
The author(s) confirm that there are no financial or non-financial competing interests.
Statement of funding
No funding was received.
References
Aranzadi, J. (2013). The natural link between virtue ethics and political virtue: The morality of the market. Journal of business ethics, 118(3), 487-496.
Bonvin, J. M., & Dembinski, P. H. (2002). Ethical issues in financial activities. Journal of Business Ethics, 37(2), 187-192.
Dembinski, P. H. (2017). Ethics and responsibility in finance. Routledge.
Graafland, J. (2021). Ethics and Economics: An Introduction to Free Markets, Equality and Happiness. Taylor & Francis.
Mccloskey, D. N. (2006). The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce. University Of Chicago Press.
Sikula Sr., A. (1996). Concepts of Moral Management and Moral Maximization. Ethics & Behavior, 6(3), 181–188
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Reviewed By:
Mayukh Mukhopadhyay
Executive Doctoral Candidate
Indian Institute of Management Indore
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